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TO THE CHANCELLOR OF THE EXCHEQUER.

LETTER I.

"Something must be done."

Botley, 25 Oct. 1815.

SIR—This phrase is in the mouth of every man of every class in the country, which feels itself, at the end of this long pursuit of glory and of happiness, in a state somewhat like the citizen, who, after having passed forty years amidst smoke and noise and stench, in order to amass the means of living easily and tranquilly and happily for the remainder of his days, mopes about in his country box like a fish out of water; or, like a new married man, who has been for months up to head and ears in love, and who, at the end of about four or eight days, according to circumstances, begins to wonder what ails him. A Frenchman told me once, in Philadelphia, that in about a week after he was married, he was seized with the idea, that he was not the same identical person that he was before, and that he looked in the glass and felt his arms and legs (*Je me touchoit*," were his words) to ascertain the fact. In the course of a few weeks, however, he found that he really was the same man as before, with a suitable diminution of spirits, or, what is vulgarly called pluck.

Such, or thereabouts, is the present state of feeling in this country. Every one is disappointed. Every one, however ignorant, begins to perceive, that this career of war and this harvest of glory, have not yielded happiness. People do not know *how* it is; but, they know, that they are *all in distress*. They see that we have reduced the French nation to submission to the Bourbons; they see that we have imprisoned Napoleon for life; they hear of the intended Waterloo column; they see that the Church and all our venerable establishments have been preserved unto us; they see hundreds of English and Hanoverian knights created; they see peace and even plenty; and yet they are miserable. Agriculture languishes; trade follows agriculture; nobody has

money to pay rent, taxes, or debts.—A *corn bill* has not *protected* the farmer. The cheapness of food has not lessened the misery of the poor. Nothing sells. The nation perishes in the midst of the spending of the produce of successive abundant harvests.

This state of things draws from every one the phrase at the head of this Letter. The Banker, when he sees himself compelled to refuse his usual discounts, tells his applicant, that "*something must be done*." The farmer (formerly so gay on his yeomanry cavalry horse, and so ready to hack the Jacobins), when he is offered 17 shillings instead of 37 shillings a head for his South Down Ewes, squeezes out his thick lips, swells his nostrils, shrugs up his shoulders, throws his jolter head on one side, with a nod, and exclaims, "*by — zummert must be done*." The landlord, who has vociferated for war, taxation, sedition and treason bills for two and twenty long years, when his steward, instead of ten thousand, brings him five hundred pounds in money and half a hundred notices to quit, observes, with one of Lord Burleigh's shakes of the head: "*really, Mr. Trusty, government must do something*. Parliament meets in February. I do not know what the Chancellor of the Exchequer means to propose, though I am very intimate with him; but *something must be done*." The tradesman, who has, for months past, used the door-knocker much more than his hammer or scissors, when, for the twentieth time, he is told to *call again*, goes muttering away, that "*something must be done*." In short, all agree, that it is impossible to go on long in our present course. The parson, the lawyer, the doctor, the very lowest of labourers say that a change of *some sort must take place*. The "*loyal*," as they call themselves, observe, very seriously, that Parliament must do *something*; and, the *Jacobins*, as they are called, with more of curiosity than sorrow on their countenance, say, "*now let us see what will be done*."

All persons, of every class, are now Sir, looking to you. Some think, that

you can conjure money into their pockets; others that you can pay the soldiers, sailors, judges, placemen, pensioners, and the Royal Family some how or other without money. The farmers generally most firmly believe, that you can raise the price of their produce, for which you would have their blessings and the curses of the rest of the country, especially the army, the navy, and the annuitants. What you will do it is hard for me to say; or, rather, *what may*, you will go to work; for, in substance, I know, that you *must* do, in the course of about two or three years, one of three things. You must diminish the interest of the debt; you must cause large additional quantities of paper-money to be issued, so as to bring the guinea back again to be worth 28s. or 30s.; or you must suffer the whole of the paper system to go to atoms.

The people do not perceive the real cause of their distress. The farmer sees his wheat fall from 15s. to 7s. a bushel. He ascribes it to the defeat of Napoleon, and says that *he* was the *best friend of the farmers*. Others think, that things will *come about*. Others damn the French, and say that it is their produce that lowers ours in price. Others curse, most unjustly, the parsons, and say that it is the tythes which we pay, and which the French do not pay, which is the cause of our ruin; and, a stupid man in Wiltshire of the name of *Bennett* has actually written and published a long pamphlet to show, that the parsons have no right to what they receive. Nobody sees, or, at least, appears to see, that their distress arises from *the debt and the military establishment and other fixed expences, entailed on us by the war*; and from the attempt which is now making to bring us upon a *par* of exchange with other countries, by *diminishing the quantity of our paper-money*.

I contended, with Mr. Huskisson, that wheat must continue to be, on an average about 15s. a bushel, or that the taxes could not be paid in sufficient amount to meet interest on the debt, and to pay the other expences of the year. You are now trying the experiment of disproving that position; but, I shall soon see you, I think, compelled to give it the most complete sanction. Again, the Bullion Committee formally declared, that, by *drawing in their paper judiciously*, the bank might be

able to pay in gold and silver at the end of two years. I contended, that this was impossible, *as long as the interest of the debt continued to be paid*; for, that, if the quantity of paper were to be so *diminished* as to bring the pound note to be worth 20s. in gold, *the people, who pay the taxes to support the funds must all be ruined*; and this ruin is now actually taking place in consequence of *an attempt to raise the value of the paper*. The Bank, in endeavouring to follow the advice, and to act upon the principles, of the Bullion Committee, has plunged agriculture and trade and rents and debts and credits all into confusion. And was not this a consequence for any man of common sense to foresee? If his head was not clear enough to conceive the idea, was it not so plainly marked out for him in my "*Paper against Gold*" as to be palpable to one almost an idiot? Was it not as plain as your nose is upon your face, that the land (from which all ability to pay taxes proceeds) could never pay interest in paper worth 20s. in the pound, for money which had been borrowed for it, and salaries (including pay of soldiers and sailors) which had taken place, in a paper worth 12s. or 15s. in the pound? When Wheat was 15s. a bushel, the land was able to pay; but, if Wheat be, by a diminution of the quantity of paper, made worth only 7s. a bushel, can it still be able to pay? The Corn Bill is, as I always said it would be, wholly unavailing. But, what a monstrous absurdity, to deal out a Corn-bill, with one hand, in order to *protect* the farmer; and, with the other hand, to mow him down by a diminution of the paper-money.

To make this matter plain to you, Sir, if it be not already so, let us suppose, the interest of the Debt and the other expences to be paid *in wheat* instead of money; and, that farmer Gripum is assessed at 500 bushels of Wheat, leaving him 200 for his landlord and 300 for other purposes, and that he never grows any thing but Wheat. All of a sudden the government comes and demands 1,000 bushels, instead of 500. It is clear, that the landlord goes without his rent, and that Gripum must be instantly ruined, if he has no extraneous fund to resort to; and, this can be the case in comparatively very few instances. Well, now, how does this differ from the paper operation? In consequence of the great quantity of paper-money, Gripum can pay his

share of the interest of the Debt and of the Expences of Army, Royal Family, &c. by selling 500 bushels of his Wheat; but, the Government, or the Bank, or both, or the *Thing* that sways, call it by what name you will, diminishes the quantity of paper so as to compel poor Gripum, whose helmet shone so bright against the Jacobins and Levellers, to sell the whole of the 1,000 bushels to pay his share of the interest of the Debt and of the Expences incurred by the Anti-jacobin war. Now, where is the *difference* in the two cases?

I have, you will say, supposed an *extreme* case. I have supposed Gripum to be wholly swallowed up at once, helmet, uniform, horse, and all; but, if these extreme cases have not very frequently occurred, the effect is only different in *degree*; and, because the farmers are not *all completely smashed at one blow*, you are not to suppose, that the blow is ineffectual as to the total smashing. The greater part of farmers have, they *must* have some *capital*; that is to say, the amount of a year or two's produce, over and above the demands of the current year. Some have money at use. For these cases, they flee to the capital to sustain them under the first blow, and to obtain a little time for them. Some are able to stand two or three blows. But, I imagine, that a second blow will, if inflicted, nearly turn them up; and, in the meanwhile, the work of retrenchment goes on, and particularly that of diminishing the use of taxed articles. The tradesman feels, twitch for twitch, with the farmer. One is the Belly and the other a Member. The latter was highly delighted, last year, when he saw the farmer's produce falling, and said, that *he*, the tradesman's turn of enjoyment was now come. But, as I told the worthy Mayor of Southampton, Mr. ROWCLIFF, it would come to pass, so it has come to pass, that the tradesman would soon find, that, if Gripum became *poor*, those who lived by selling his wife baubles and himself drink and clothes, would wholly starve or must turn out to beg. Gripum, after all, will stand the storm longer than Crispin, Snip, and Boniface. He'll nail his shoes, make his wife patch his coat, and go home from market hungry and thirsty. He has always something that he can eat, and malt, though taxed, keeps pace with the price of his wheat in all but the tax. Where-

as they must live, if they live at all, upon the profits and superfluities of the land. Thus is the depression felt through all the veins of the community, and thus do you experience a degree of embarrassment, which that bold botherer, Pitt, never had to encounter. He got over the stoppage of cash-payments at the Bank, by reports of Committees, subscribing combinations, false alarms, and divers other devices, calculated to deceive a people full of fear of the enemy, and easily duped from their natural credulity. But, your's is a case that can receive no aid from trick and contrivance. It is not now a question of jacobin or anti-jacobin; it is no question of alarm; no question about religion or government; no Yeomanry Cavalry, Loyal Associations, or Volunteer Corps will now avail. No appeals from the forum or the pulpit will be of any use. It is not a matter of seditious or treasonable practices. There are no Corresponding Societies, or Pop-gun plots. It is not a question of *passion* but of *money*. The means that would put down a thousand market mobs will now avail nothing. Majorities and minorities are here out of the question. No acts of parliament or proclamations; no societies for the suppression of vice; no Lancaster Schools; no Bible Associations, will do any good.

Thus, Sir, have I just opened the subject. In future letters I shall go fully into it; and, in the meanwhile I remain your most obedient servant,

WM. COBBETT.

SPEECH OF LOUIS.

How any man, calling himself the chief of the French nation, could, after her long career of glorious exploits, have the face to meet even the pretended representatives of that same nation and announce to it the degrading conditions, which he had accepted of in the name of France, would astonish the world, had not the world been so long acquainted with the character of such men. Five fortresses, the scenes of republican heroism, to be ceded in perpetuity; one to be demolished; a tribute of 29 millions sterling; 150,000 enemy's troops to be *maintained by the French in French territory for five years!* And yet this man has "*sweet satisfaction*" in meeting his Chambers of Peers and Deputies!

Oh! the sweet Bourbon! There are millions of men in France, who rushed to arms to drive Brunswick and his swarms of regulars from the soil of France. These men remember the cry of "*Landau or Death.*" They remember the decree of death against any man who should even propose to *treat* with an enemy having his foot on the soil of France. These men remember the high spirit which animated the nation, and the dread which its anger excited under the Republic. These men will never forgive the House of Bourbon and its allies, the English, the Germans, and the Royalists.

Louis *le Desiré* went, it seems, to the Chamber, accompanied by "a strong military force, including the Swiss Body Guards." Mr. MADISON has no need of military escorts, and especially of foreign troops. The old Bourbons always surrounded themselves with foreign troops. It was the insolence of "the *Royal German Regiment*" that produced the destruction of the Bastille, and that led to many acts of outrage. It was those same Germans who were appointed to cover the flight of Louis XVI. It was the Swiss that made the last attempt to keep him, by force, upon the throne, while Brunswick was advancing with his legions. These mercenaries, these foreign hirelings, are again at their post. Have they no recollection of the 10th of August, 1792! The Swiss have always let themselves out to fight for foreign kings. They have frequently met against each other in battle, being in the service of opposing kings. The French republicans put an end to this horrible traffic. Louis has renewed it. But why had he any troops at all to escort him? If he were so beloved and *desired*, what need of guards? Why not French guards, if any? Could he not trust even his *Royalists*?

Louis begins his speech by calling the return and assumption of power of Napoleon an *usurpation*. Was the assumption of power by William III. in England an *usurpation*? A correspondent, sometime ago, put this matter in a very clear light; but, I cannot refrain, here, from saying a word or two upon the subject. William, without any law passed to authorize him, without any vote of either house of parliament to invite him, without any election of him by the people, landed in England

from Holland, by the aid of a Dutch fleet and accompanied by a Dutch army. James II. then reigning, finding that he was unsupported by the army and by the people, some of whom hated and some of whom despised him, *ran away out of the country*. The parliament, by and bye, met. They approved of the conduct of William; declared that James had abdicated the throne *by going away out of the country*; declared, without any express election by the people, William to be King; and made it high treason to adhere to James. Napoleon, without any law passed to authorize him, without any vote of the Chambers to invite him, without any election of him by the people, landed in France from Elba. Louis *le Desiré*, then reigning, finding that he was unsupported by the army and the people, *ran away out of the country*. The Chambers, by and bye, met. They approved of the conduct of Napoleon; declared that Louis had no right to the throne; declared, *with* an almost express election by the people, (in the sanction of the new constitution) Napoleon to be their Emperor; and made it high treason to adhere to Louis. The only points of *difference* are these: William came *supported by a foreign army* to assume kingly power in England: Napoleon came surrounded by *native Frenchmen*. William was a foreigner by birth and allegiance: Napoleon was a *native born citizen of France*. Therefore, it appears to me, that Monsieur *le Desiré* ought to be cautious how he talks about *usurpations*; for, it will require, I imagine, a little more ingenuity than the House of Bourbon, with all their *bon mots*, are possessed, of to draw a satisfactory distinction between his case and that of the stupid bigot James II. as far as relates to the question of usurpation. James sought and obtained the aid of the rooted enemy of England, I mean the Bourbons, to cram him again down the throats of the English. The effort, often repeated, wholly failed. Le Desiré has, thus far, been more fortunate. There is no doubt that the bigotted tyrant, James, would have given up the Isle of Wight, Portsmouth, Plymouth, Dover, and the mouth of the Thames to the Bourbons; that he would have agreed to make his people pay a tribute to them, and to support a French army to keep them in their obedience to him. But his allies want-

ed the means to enforce their will; and his silly adherents, who called themselves Royalists, were hanged as rebels.

Louis *le Desiré* next talks of his *disinterestedness*. He would have "*blessed Providence*, if the usurpation had *affected none but himself*." What does he mean? Why, I suppose, that, if the *nation* had not been suffering in consequence of the usurpation, he should have thanked God for having relieved him from the burden of a crown. When I hear a man appeal to Providence, I always suspect him of being conscious that he is in the wrong; and, it would, I believe, be very difficult for Louis to shew what the nation would have *suffered*, in consequence of the return of Napoleon. It is notorious, that, under him and the republican Assemblies, the people of France were more free and more happy than at any former period; that France flourished, not only in agriculture but in all the arts and sciences; that the people got rid, and remained rid, of all those odious and infamous oppressions, which weighed them down, degraded and stultified them, under the Bourbons. All accounts say, that the character of the people has been changed; that it is, or was last year, a character worthy of men. It is notorious, that the government of the Bourbons was a cruel despotism; that it tyrannized over the very thoughts of men. How, then, does this man make it out, that the *usurpation*, as he calls it, made the *nation* suffer? On the contrary, it is he who has made the *nation* suffer. Its sufferings, its tributes, its disgraces, came in *his* train, and not in that of the brave and generous, though foolishly ambitious Napoleon, who, though he be forbidden to read any thing which our ministers disapprove of, will, I dare say, hear of the sufferings which the Bourbons have brought upon France; and that alone will be quite sufficient triumph for him.

The next topic is, the "*marks of affection*," which his people have given him "in the most *critical moments*. Which were they, Monsieur *le Desiré*? When were those moments? When they decreed your outlawry in 1792? When you went back under the wing of the Allies in 1814? When you decamped in 1815? When you have lately appeared at the windows of your palace? Or when you went to the chamber, escorted by *Swiss troops*? But, if it be true, that the people of France

have constantly shewn an affection for you, what a return do you make them in agreeing to lay a tribute of 29 millions sterling upon them, and in keeping 150,000 foreign troops to insult and to burden them? Why, if you can safely rely upon the people, have you agreed to these terms? Were you *compelled by the Allies*? If you were, who but *you* have brought this disgrace and these injuries upon France? If you have had the people's affection, ought you not to have perished rather than submit to such terms? If you had had the people's affection, why did you hold out to them the dread of 1,100,000 bayonets? Why did you talk of the *Allies* the moment you heard of the landing of Napoleon? Why did not your allies retreat, the moment you were on the throne and Napoleon in captivity? Why, if the people of France love you, have you now procured a law to imprison and keep in prison, *without trial*, whomsoever your agents charge with crimes against *you*, your *family*, or the *state*? Why thus, even at the outset, re-open those Bastilles, and renew, in effect, those *Lettres de Cachet*, which made the old government so odious? Are laws such as this wanted in a country, where the people *love* their rulers; Look across the Atlantic. See how the chief magistrate of a free people acts. The country is invaded at various points; plunder and depredation are at work; a powerful fleet and army assail an infant state and a raw militia; the capital itself is in flames; faction is tearing at the heart of the country. But, no laws are passed to change the ordinary course of justice. The Chief Magistrate relies upon the good sense and the valour of a free people; he pursues the straight line of duty; and he sees his country crowned with success against that very power to which you have made France bend herself to the earth.

He next speaks of the *profound grief*, which, he says, the nation will know, he must have felt at signing away the territory, the fortresses, the money, and the honour of France; but, that "*the very safety of his kingdom* rendered this great "*determination necessary*." He should have said *the safety of his and his family's living in ease and splendor on the labour of others*. Then there would have been some sense in his words. But, what sort of *safety* is that to the people of France

which imposes a monstrous tribute on them; which lays their frontier naked; which quarters upon them 150,000 foreign soldiers for five years? What does national safety mean, if it does not mean safety against its enemies? And, by this treaty, he has agreed to make his people suffer all the horrors of a conquered state for five years; in addition, to expose them to the incursions of those enemies for ages, as far as he has any reason to look to consequences; and, moreover, to make them pay tribute, during that time, to those whom he called *his allies*. This is the sort of "*safety*" which the Bourbons provide for France. The republican Assemblies and Napoleon had no idea of such safety. But, the "*bon bourgeoisie*," who, we were told, were so attached to the Bourbons; "*les bons gens, les bons pères de famille, les amis de l'ordre*;" yes, these "*good folks, these good fathers of families, these friends of order*," if they really were attached to the Bourbons, merit most richly all they are to suffer. As to the "*profound grief*" of this so much-desired King, I dare say it is very sincere. He would have liked to keep all the territory and fortresses, and to have had the 29 millions sterling, and also to have had 150,000 of his own troops to keep the people of France in subjection. But, he could not have reigned upon these terms; therefore he agreed to the other. And, in spite of all his professions, and all the cant of his adherents about "*the best of kings*," which is very impudent, by the bye, seeing that *our* king is alive, whom all the world knows to be the *best of kings*: in spite of all this, the people of France, if there were a Bastille in every town and every street, must know, that they are punished and disgraced *for him and his family*. Nothing could have been better for the cause of freedom; nothing more marked against despots. It is a striking example of the conduct of a king, compared with that of republican rulers. It is a striking example of what kings and their families, and their noblesse, and their priests, will do for the sake of reigning and possessing power and the means of luxurious living. Talk of *his sacrifices*! He has made no sacrifices. He has all his cooks and his Swiss attendants the same as ever. His family offered to make him *gifts*. But, he should have remarked, by way of parenthesis, that they meant to take

the amount of those gifts from the *people* by way of preliminary. It must be a great consolation to the people of France to learn, that they are to receive such assistance as this. If the "*bons pères de famille*" had not been so much attached to the Bourbons, and had come forth to fight under Napoleon, they would have had to pay neither the Bourbons nor the Allies. Besides, *who* is it that has exacted terms from him to fill him with "*profound grief*?" Why, *his allies*; those who restored him to his throne; those who have kept him upon that throne; those, under whose banners his family and noblesse fought for years against the people of France. He threatened the people of France with the bayonets of 1,100,000 of his allies. He called upon them not to resist his allies. He forbade them to contribute towards the defence of France against his allies. And now, when he and *his allies* have agreed to impose a tribute on the people of France, and to make them support 150,000 foreign troops to keep them in awe, and make them obey him, he professes his "*profound grief*" at the measure! Even those, who, having got possession of property by the revolution, and who hoped that the return of the old government, leaving them in that possession, would make them, in time, little Lords; even this selfish class; these "*good fathers of families*," will perceive that this "*profound grief*" is a little out of place; and, they will now, seeing all their hopes blasted, begin to perceive, that they have been very great fools as well as selfish knaves, who cared not who were oppressed, who cared not how ignorant or brutal others were, so that they prospered.

The rest of the speech is mere commonplace cant, except the proposition "*to make religion re-flourish*." That is to say, I suppose, *re-establish* the old regime in religion. This, however, even 150,000 gentlemen in red and blue coats will find too much for them; and yet, if this be not done, nothing is done. All will go to atoms again in a very few years.

It is strange to observe how John Bull seems to feel under this weight of *Glory*. One would have thought, that he would have been mad with joy; but, not a single bonfire do we see throughout the whole country. He is more chop-fallen than at any former period. *Peace* and *Glory* seem to have over-charged his stomach; and

he wonders why he is ill. He has his forebodings that *all* is not yet over. He wonders what 150,000 foreign soldiers are left in France for; and well he may, since he was fool enough to believe, that the French people *longed for the Bourbons*. The truth is, that Louis and his Allies were very well agreed. They saw, that if they left the French People a chance of rising, they would rise upon *both*. They saw, on the other hand, that to attempt to keep them down by force, as they are now doing, *might*, in the end, produce a still more dreadful new revolution; but, this appeared more *distant*, and was not *certain*. Therefore they adopted it. But, if the kings (all except Louis) had listened more to reason than to passion, they would have seen, that their interest was decidedly with the Napoleon dynasty. Napoleon had a son. His family would have supplied the place of the Bourbons. The French people, by degrees, might have been brought to relish something like the old regime. Their admiration of his deeds might have made them forget that he wore a crown. And thus the cause of liberty might, for ages, have been deeply injured. But *now*, this tribute; this vassalage to 150,000 foreign bayonets; this surrender and demolition of fortresses; this plunder of Museums. These things agreed to by a king, will decide for ever the fate of kingly government in the minds of the people of France. At any rate, let that people now, or at any future time, do what they will to the Bourbons and their allies, it ought to surprize nobody. They have been charged with injustice and cruelty towards the late Bourbon and his family and noblesse. Their grounds of hatred towards *them* were not universally known and understood. But the grounds of their present hatred all the world are acquainted with. They have tasted of days of liberty; they have seen their country a republic: they now see and feel, that they are under a Bourbon monarchy. The contrast is so palpable and so strong, that there cannot be a soul in the country not to feel it. All must remember Marengo, the Helder, Austerlitz, Jena, Freydlund, &c. &c. And all have seen their Museums pillaged and feel the tribute imposed on them.

WM. CORBETT.

Since writing the above, I have read a letter of Louis XVIII. published in the *Times* newspaper, which appears to have been written by this man, in February 1795, while he resided at Verona, where he assumed the character of Regent of France during the minority of the son of Louis XVI. What Louis XVIII. has now *done* for France; what *blessings* the people of France are now enjoying under his "*paternal*" government, are no longer a secret. He has told us of his "*profound grief*" at signing the treaty, by which France has been degraded; and of his love, his affection, and his regard for his beloved subjects; all this he has told us, for the purpose of making it be believed, that the sad changes which have taken place and are still meditated in France, that the disgraceful terms which have been imposed upon it, are, and always have been, contrary to his views, to his wishes, and to the feelings of his heart. If the language of his speech does not mean this, it means nothing at all; it is of no more import than the braying of an ass, or the chattering of a magpie. It is said, that the conditions to which France has submitted, is not the act of the *good*, the *kind*, the *tender hearted* Louis, but of his ministers. Supposing such an excuse admissable; supposing that the much-desired-king is now really under the controul of his priests and nobles, and, of necessity, obliged to assent to their measures; supposing all this, can the same thing be said of him when he was at Verona in the year 1795, and wrote the letter, now published as genuine. At that period, he could have no ministers to influence his conduct. He was, himself, merely the minister of his nephew, and if ever he was sincere in any declaration, he must have been sincere at this moment. Now what does this famous letter tell us?—Why, it tells us, that Louis XVIII. who *now* professes "*profound grief*" for the misfortunes and miseries, which he and his family have brought upon France, never had other views or principles but what were consistent with the re-establishment of the *Ancient* tyrannical and despotic government of France. "*All I have in view is the restoration of the Catholic Religion, and of our Ancient Constitution.*"—"If I cannot obtain from the favour of God to confer on the King my nephew, when he shall have obtained his

"majority, his whole authority, and his government free from abuse, I shall at least have inculcated in him such principles as will easily enable him to complete the work I have commenced for him."

Can any one, after so explicit a declaration, believe, that it ever was the wish or the intention of this man, to give liberty to France?—Who will now attempt to offer so idle a plea, as the interference of his ministers, or even his Allies, in justification of measures, which Louis XVIII. always approved in his heart? He well knew, from the beginning, that the "restoration of the Catholic Religion," and of the "Ancient Constitution," could not be effected but by a foreign force. He also knew, from the beginning, that to accomplish this, these foreigners would impose the most disgraceful and degrading terms upon France. With what pretensions to sincerity can he, therefore, now come forward, and profess "profound grief" for events, which he himself was the means of bringing about, and which he foresaw would happen, if he and his family persisted in restoring the power of the clergy, and the "whole authority" of a king, under whom the *Basile*, and *Lettres de Cachet* were allowed to exist, and his subjects treated so much like slaves, that they were the objects of the contempt and ridicule of all other nations?—It is useless to argue upon premises so clear. One of the satellites of this kind, this good, this pious monarch tells us, "I am certain that this miserable Charter was *always* in opposition with the King's principles."—Who doubts this? The much-desired Louis, has frequently boasted of giving this Charter to the people; he has sworn, too, to maintain it. But so did Louis XVI. swear to the constitution which restricted his authority. All the world knows how that unfortunate man kept his oath, and what were the consequences. It now remains to be seen, whether his successor, who, it seems, "was *always* in opposition" to the Charter, which he has repeatedly guaranteed by oath, will, in defiance of all consequences, attempt to restore "the Catholic religion" and the Ancient Constitution" of France. That some attempt of this kind will be made, seems pretty evident. But it is not so clear, to me at least, that success will attend such an enterprize. The following is the letter of Louis, as it appeared in the *Times* of the 26th inst. and which the

profligate writer of that paper calls "an admirable letter":—

LETTER OF LOUIS XVIII.

Verona, Feb. 1795.

TO MONSIEUR MOUNIER, EX-MEMBER OF THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

"When you express timidity, Sir, at addressing me openly on the subject of the means you conceive calculated to restore order in France, you seem to forget the claims you enjoy to my consideration. My recollection is more fortunate: I shall always remember the conduct you pursued towards the King, my brother, on the 5th of October, 1789, though charged by the Assembly, over which you then presided, with a mission so opposed to the duties of a faithful subject, which you so zealously fulfilled. I shall not forget, that if perfidious counsels had not prevailed over the reiterated advice which you transmitted to the King, he would have quitted Versailles, and perhaps would have prevented, by this step, the deluge of crimes and disasters with which France has since been inundated. The remembrance of a day so terrific in itself, but so honourable to you, determines me to give you a particular mark of my esteem, by candidly imparting to you my sentiments: the object of my letter is one of general utility. You are sincerely desirous of the restoration of monarchy; what I shall say to you will serve as a basis for your personal means. You think rightly in making a great distinction between crime and error, the former provokes the hatred of the just and the rigour of the laws; the latter deserves more pity than indignation, and when honestly confessed, it would be injustice to deny it indulgence. I have never ceased to entertain this opinion. I am ready to raise up and embrace the man, who, being unsullied by guilt, but having been hurried away, either by ignorance or weakness, or even by erroneous ideas, should throw himself at my feet, acknowledge his insult, and solicit my pardon. This sentiment is not only mine, it is that of my brother, and of all my family. The monsters who have seduced the French people, by fallacious promises of happiness, to tyrannise over them, and enrich themselves with spoil, know the bottom of our hearts; but, as they are aware also, that, when these truths shall become known, their edifice will tumble of itself, they resort to every source of calumny to stifle them; but this obstacle will

be overcome by dint of courage, and perseverance; and the nation will learn, in spite of them, that we love her, that we only wish for her good, and that all our labours tend to that object; she will discover that the emigrants who have been so grossly calumniated, quitted their country, not so much to avoid submission to laws contrary to their duty and honour, as to seek against those laws, which she at present abhors equally with them, a support which they could not meet in France, where a set of miscreants had possessed themselves of the national power. In a word, sure of my sentiments and those of my family, France will equally know, that if any feeling of private vengeance blended itself with the general desire of restoring order, I should suppress it, and exert the royal authority deposited in my hands, to maintain a perfect balance between all the subjects of the King; but these indulgent dispositions, this inclination to pardon, even to excuse, are in my heart, it is in the law of God that I find them; they are not dictated by irksomeness of my situation, by an anxiety to quit it. My duty and my honour equally *forbid me, at any price, to abate the authority of the King*, which is confided to me; **ALL I HAVE IN VIEW IS THE RESTORATION OF THE CATHOLIC RELIGION AND OF OUR ANCIENT CONSTITUTION.** I am far from confounding, as the perfidy of the detractors of the throne have but too often done, that Constitution with the abuses that have crept into the administration. The only wish of the late King, my brother, was, to destroy them. Such is mine also. I will labour unremittingly for that purpose; and, if I cannot obtain from the favour of God, to confer on the King, my nephew, when he shall have attained his majority, **HIS WHOLE AUTHORITY** and his Government free from abuse, *I shall have at least inculcated in him such principles as will easily enable him to complete the work I shall have commenced for him*; but, I repeat, it is only reform that I wish, and I will never lay a daring hand on our Constitution; upon this point I know of no compromise which can be compatible with my honour and the good of the State. The indulgence to which I am so much disposed will only apply to the guilty, and not to the results of crimes; my maxim is, toleration for individuals, intolerance for principles. The natural consequence of this maxim is to forget the opinions which men have had, but to keep a watchful

eye on those which men have. I do not think it just to admit to the honour of restoring the throne, only those, whose principles at all times pure, afford them no occasion for repentance, but *I will not* (if I may so express myself), while curing the patient, leave behind the germ of a fresh disease, more cruel than the first. Yet that would be the inevitable result of a combination of true Royalists with those men who, after the restoration of France, might still entertain the desire of causing their erroneous opinions, to prevail, and who would thereby expose us to relapse into the disorders from which we are scarcely emerged. I know that men are only accountable to God for the opinions which they possess at the bottom of their souls, and I do not presume to usurp his right; but they are accountable to the sovereign authority for all manifestation of opinion. Henry IV. forgave the head of the League, but he exterminated the League itself, and its chiefs (the Duke de Mayenne the foremost) became zealous Royalists. Charles II. made use of Monck, but Monck restored him his crown, such as his father had enjoyed it before the long Parliament. In these times, all who are true Royalists, whether they have always been so, or, that they have sincerely abjured their errors, are worthy of co-operating in the **RESTORATION OF MONARCHY**, because they alone will labour with good faith to re-establish it on solid foundations: those who have hitherto persisted in their errors, may yet repent, but *the great work once accomplished, the time of indulgence is no more.*"

To this letter the author adds—"I am certain that this miserable Charter was always in opposition with the King's principles: it could never be his work. All the evils of which this Charter has been the cause, therefore fall on his rash and perfidious advisers, who, abusing the confidence of so just and enlightened a Prince, have presented him with this disastrous invention as a means of arriving at the restoration of France."

Here follows a long declaration of the King, dated in 1795, the first year of his reign. *This declaration is entirely in the spirit of the letter we have just given.* To this document is subjoined by the author of the pamphlet, the following observation on the present House of Deputies:—"Who could, in so respectable an assembly, be rash enough to propose maintaining the Charter? The wisdom of its members denote

that it is in perfect harmony with the King, with justice, and with reason; and that they will propose to his Majesty, of whom indeed they form only the Council, THE RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF OUR ANTIQUE CONSTITUTION, and thus put an end to the calamities of our wretched country."

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT—PARLIAMENTARY REFORM—EDINBURGH POLITICS.

Edinburgh, Oct. 15, 1815.

MR. COBBETT—I have taken the liberty of addressing to you, by this day's post, a copy of the *Caledonian Mercury* of yesterday, to which your attention is particularly requested by the friends to freedom and justice of this city, respecting a most wanton and cowardly attack made on MAJOR CARTWRIGHT, by one of our most notorious time-serving and pensioned prints; the printer and editor of which happens to be a vile apostate from the sacred cause, which he is now attempting to condemn and villify. This paper, viz. the *Edinburgh Correspondent*, having refused insertion of the Major's very excellent and temperate reply, his agent had some difficulty in even getting it a place as an advertisement in the *Mercury*; which shews pretty plainly the state and liberty of the press in this seat of corruption and servility. We have, therefore, to request the aid of your excellent paper, and independent talents, to assist us in publishing to our fellow-countrymen the deplorable state we are placed in, and the infamous conduct of that tool of corruption, who, with impunity, attacks all and sundry, without giving any one an opportunity of being heard in his defence. Such conduct deserves severe reprehension.

I am, &c.

A FRIEND TO JUSTICE.

MAJOR CARTWRIGHT.

The Agent of Major Cartwright requests the Editor of the *Caledonian Mercury* to insert the annexed letter, addressed to the Editor of the *Edinburgh Correspondent*, in reply to a most wanton attack made by that paper on the character and principles of the Major, and which the Editor has very unjustly refused to insert in his paper.

Edinburgh, 12th October, 1815.

TO THE EDITOR OF THE EDINBURGH CORRESPONDENT.

Durham, 9th October, 1815.

SIR,—in your paper of the 7th you have allowed yourself to offer, for the entertainment of your readers, certain insinuations, tending to convey an unfavourable opinion of my understanding and my character. I therefore trust that through your sense of justice, I shall be allowed to offer to the same readers a few reasons tending to show that insinuations are not, to such an end, quite so proper as arguments and facts. Deal only in fair argument and real fact, and then, Sir, so far as my understanding and character are concerned, you shall be at full liberty to say whatever you please; as I do not in any case hold truth to be a libel; nor will I, on that ground, ever appeal to the law as a shield against injury.

You say that you "know not whether Major Cartwright's political whimsies proceed from a disordered mind, or from a turbulent spirit." You also say, that "you have not been informed" of the particulars of the harangue "which he last week delivered to a crowd in M'Ewan's Rooms." Had you, Sir, been present, you would have perceived that his object was to correct the mischiefs flowing from the "political whimsies" of those who prefer a Parliamentary Representation, made up as Mr. Burke says, of forms, and types, and shadows, "and fictions of law," to such a presentation as must result from free election, according to the Constitution, as soon as that Constitution shall be practically enjoyed.

You have likewise, Sir, spoken of a letter which lately appeared "under his (the Major's) signature, proposing the supposed perfect representation of the people of France as a model of imitation for the inhabitants of our island." Had you, Sir, either given due attention to the context in that "letter," as you call it, or known "the particulars of the harangue" above mentioned, you would, I presume, have avoided this erroneous statement. Having more than eight and thirty years ago actually "proposed" for England, Representation proportioned to Population, I had no need to go to France for instruction on this subject, wherefore the words to which you allude are only indirectly instructive; being intended as mere apostrophe and expostulation, which quoting them will shew. They are as follow:—"Shall then the people of Britain behold the French nation left by their conquerors in possession of a real representation, equalized in due proportion to the population of her Departments, and remain insensible to her own degradation, under an insulting mockery, defrauded of the substance of Representation, by those

"monopolists of suffrage the *Patrons of rotten Boroughs*, and the holders of *County Superiorities*?"

You tell your readers, that, "We will discover that when it shall be *proper*, consistently with *the state of Europe*, to revive the question of Parliamentary Reform, there will be no need of a lecture," &c. But what a reform in our own domestic polity, which is essential to justice, to the very existence of our liberties, and to the security of our property against arbitrary taxation, has to do "with *the state of Europe*," we have yet to learn; for you have not had the kindness to explain the connection or dependence.—Before we proceed thus to repair the delapidated fortress of our own freedom, are we to wait until the *Venus de Medici* have regained her old apartment at Florence?—until the *Apollo* have travelled back to *Rome*?—and until the famous *Horses* caper again on their former pedestals at *Venice*? Or for what else in "*the state of Europe*," are we to postpone the doing of our own necessary work at home?

Giving you credit for not having "*a disordered mind*," I wish, Sir, you would have the goodness to indicate in what particular "*state of Europe*" it may "be *proper*" to mind our own business; and by what time you think we may hope to set about it. If, Sir, in your judgment, I labour under "*a disordered mind*," and am possessed with "*a turbulent spirit*," I see not how those who agree with me in opinion and conduct, and they are many, can escape the same imputations; nor how it comes to pass that you have not adduced any one argument, nor stated any one fact, in justification of your insinuations.—

As your readers might very possibly have some curiosity on these points, it seems somewhat extraordinary, that you made not a single attempt to satisfy them. You might, with great truth, have accused us of maintaining, that the House of Commons, as now appointed, 'doth not in any constitutional or rational sense represent the nation.' We, in our defence, could only have asked, "Is this a melancholy truth, or is it a "*political whimsy*?"

You might truly have charged us with declaring, that the people have an undoubted right to Representation, co-extensive at least with direct 'taxation.' Is this again a truism, or is it a "*political whimsy*." You may also have proved us to have said, that the 'people have a rightful claim to an equal distribution of such Representation.' We can only again ask, Is this truth and justice, or is it a "*political whimsy*." Neither can we deny, that we have pertinaciously asserted, that the nation is entitled to Parliaments of a

continuance 'according to the constitution, namely 'not exceeding one year.'—Is this, Sir, a grave and rational question, worthy of a grave and rational answer, or is it, like the rest, a "*political whimsy*."—Are these, Sir, "the Major's rhapsodies," which you consider as "the product of a disordered mind, or of a turbulent spirit."—Unless, Sir, you drop *insinuation*, which is a very foul figure of speech, and speak plainly and soberly to these points, your readers will have reason to think, that you have not any very high respect for their understandings.

(Signed) JOHN CARTWRIGHT.

LETTER III.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE LETTERS TO LORD SHEFFIELD.

Paris, October 21, 1815.

MR. COBBETT—If I have only succeeded in shewing that our present difficulties, and particularly those of the farmer, do not arise from the pressure of the national debt, or the effects of taxation, we shall find it easier, perhaps, to persuade ourselves, that our financial and political maladies are not beyond the reach of cure. At any rate, we shall think it less necessary to have recourse to dangerous and empirical remedies, and be better prepared to admit the applicability to our own peculiar case and circumstances of those safer and more regular modes of treatment, which are to be found in the *general* principles of the science of political economy. But, so long as we consider our national debt as a burden and clog on the industry and prosperity of the country, so long shall we be disposed to attribute every temporary difficulty that agriculture or commerce may have to encounter to this source only, without so much as suspecting that they may arise from another and very different quarter. We shall think that nothing but the extinction of our debt can be of any essential service to us, and shall not even dream of looking for any other remedy. Were we, however, to reflect a moment, we should find that countries that have no debt comparatively, are subject to similar interruptions in the progress of their prosperity, and that this also has been the case with ourselves when we had no debt at all. We should find too, that this country never advanced so rapidly in wealth as it has within the last twenty or

thirty years, though it never was at any former period, half, nay, one-tenth, so much taxed. This, indeed, has been so palpably the case, that the class of political writers, whose only object it is to flatter government, have attributed our late increase of wealth to the increase of taxation. They tell us that taxation has been a spur to industry, and truly they have not been sparing of the spur, forgetting that it is a prospect of interest alone which excites men to activity and exertion; it is not easy, however, to conceive, how those who have heavy taxes to pay can persuade themselves that their purses will be filled by doing so. Wars, and debts, and taxes, instead of advancing, have lamentably retarded the progress of the country in wealth and improvement. We will proceed, then, to consider ourselves as in effect without debt, and take it for granted that the equitable payment of the interest and principal of what we now owe to ourselves, neither is, nor will be, any impediment to our progress in prosperity. The question then will be, how are we, on the supposition just made, to secure and advance our future progress in national improvement. *It is labour that is the source of all improvement, and of all wealth.* To make additions to keep up even our present stock of wealth, will demand additional labour. The animal necessities of man compel him to submit to a certain portion of labour. And it would seem, if violence had not made the surface of the earth the property of a few individuals comparatively, and supposing that in that case the arts of civilization and culture could have been introduced, that this necessity would have led in no long time to the complete cultivation and population of the globe. For it is the natural tendency of the human race, to increase in numbers so long as the means of subsistence can be increased; it would seem, therefore, that this would have speedily led, after cultivation had once begun, to a constantly extending and improving agriculture, had not circumstances arisen to prevent it. The surface of the earth, however, having been appropriated, it is no longer in the power of individuals, not proprietors, to procure the means of subsistence by inclosing land and increasing its produce by their labour, and it sometimes, as at present, may not be the interest of proprietors to do it;

and whenever that is the case, there will be a stop put to all industry and to all improvement. But there is another circumstance which has contributed as much, perhaps, as the appropriation of the soil in large quantities in the hands of a few, to retard the progress of its culture—the introduction of the precious metals as the common medium of exchange. A difference of talents and inclinations would lead different men to choose different pursuits and occupations. One would catch fish; another would make the nets necessary for the purpose. One would follow the chase, another make bows and arrows for the hunter, &c. &c. It is obvious that this first division of labour could scarcely be effected without the introduction of some common medium of exchange; but, when labour became still more subdivided, when two or three persons or more were employed in making the different parts of the same instrument or manufacture, it is clear that a medium of mutual exchange would become indispensable. Now, from the moment that gold and silver was used as money, the general progress of improvement would be limited by the relative annual produce of these metals from the mines. Whenever general produce was brought to market in a greater relative proportion than the precious metals were, the consequence would be a decline in price of the former, and an advance in that of the latter. This would naturally give a check to agricultural and manufacturing industry; because, when the price of the products of their industry began to fall, it would no longer be the interest of individuals to exert themselves, but the contrary. That the regular increase of money is necessary to, and in some sort determines the amount of the increase of wealth, facts and experience demonstrate. Mr. Hume says, that the discovery of the gold mines of America gave a spur to the industry of Europe. It could only do this by occasioning a rise in the price of commodities, owing to the increase of the relative quantity of gold, and thus making it the interest of the farmer and the manufacturer to increase the amount of their respective productions. This was the only effect this discovery could have on the efforts of European industry. Dr. Smith, too, admits, that the trade of Scotland, and of Glasgow particularly, increased rapidly after

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the banking system, and the issuing of small notes, was established there.—This could and would operate on industry in the same way as an increase of gold:—but on this subject I have said more in the two tracts before alluded to. But if any further proof were wanting of the truth of this doctrine, we shall find it in the history and experience of the last 20 or 30 years in which the paper money system has been so much extended. The absolute wealth of the country has been increased in a much greater ratio during this period, though we have been engaged during the greater part of it in the most destructive warfare than it ever was before during the same length of time, even of the most profound and prosperous peace. It would seem, then, that with an established system of paper credit, the general security of which I have endeavoured to demonstrate, there is nothing to arrest the progress of this country in improvement, except the impossibility of making more; and we may venture to predict, unless we grossly mistake the real nature of our situation, that the country will go on extending its culture and improving *on the average* so long as it admits of any improvement, although it *may* be subject to occasional checks in its progress, as is the case at present. Now the question is, how are we to prevent these *occasional* checks, and particularly such as the one we are now labouring under; *how are we to keep our agriculture constantly prosperous*. This I apprehend we can only do by securing to the farmer a *fair* price, at all times, for his grain; in other words, such a price as shall *always* leave him a reasonable profit; without this he will not *always* be disposed to extend or keep up his culture, and with it he will. Now there can be no doubt, that the human race is disposed to increase *on the average* faster in most countries, at least, than the supply of subsistence can be increased. But it is the tendency of population to increase *regularly*, and owing to the uncertainty of the seasons only, if nothing else prevented the increase and supply of subsistence, cannot be made regular. This year the crop perhaps may not be equal to more than half the consumption; the two following years, it may be almost double the demand for each of them. In consequence of this, and some other circumstances, such is the change which has just taken place with respect to our com-

mercial connections with the rest of Europe, and knowing or *believing* that we can depend on a supply of grain from abroad, in case of a deficiency at home, owing too to the cessation of the war, and of the large demands for grain for the army and navy, &c. &c. the public opinion and feeling have been brought to such a state, with respect to the amount of demand and supply, and the relative price of grain, that nothing could be more ruinous to the farmer, than an abundant crop for a year or two in succession. Notwithstanding the greatness of the crop of this year, grain is now selling for much less than it has cost to grow it. This is an evil, which in time will remedy itself, perhaps, but not before it has done great mischief. The establishment of public granaries, for the purchasing of grain by government, in plentiful seasons, and storing it against a time of scarcity, would, in all probability, completely counteract the evil. But this even is not absolutely indispensable.—*The farmer himself may always obtain a fair price for his grain.* He is, perhaps, the only tradesmen, who can at all times command an adequate price for his commodity, and it is for his *grain* alone that he can do it. If fodder and herbage be scarce, the farmer is obliged to part with his cattle at such a price as he can get:—he has not enough for them to eat, but corn eats nothing itself, and there is no substitute to be found for grain, for the food of the great mass of society. The demand for it, too, is so great and incessant that a determination not to part with it for less than a fair price, could not fail in three weeks or a month at most, to bring it to a fair price. It is the interest of every part of the community—of that of the manufacturer as well as the farmer himself, that this should be the case. How can manufactures for the home trade prosper if the farmer and his connections, that are to wear and use them, are not thriving and prosperous? How can manufactures for foreign consumption prosper, if the farmer and his connections, who must consume the greater part of the articles for which they are exchanged, be poor and unable to purchase them. Besides, if this were not so, the difference between a fair and what would be a ruinous price for his grain to the farmer, will make no perceptible difference in the price of our exports; nay, in consequence of the effect which the greater demand for foreign produce would

have on the foreign exchanges, a fair price for growing grain, and the prosperity of the farmer, would be absolutely beneficial to the manufacturer for foreign consumption. But, in short, and be this as it may, the farmer *may* obtain a fair price for his grain if he chooses, (and he cannot obtain more *in reality*, because, were he to attempt it, he would ruin the amount of his expenditure as much as he ruined the price of his grain above a fair price.) With respect to his own interests, therefore, he is a fool if he do not obtain a fair price, and with respect to those of the country, he is little better than a traitor if he do not. It appears to me too, that the same description of character will apply very well to all such as shall wish the farmer to sell his grain for less than it costs him, or that he should not make a determination, absolutely necessary, no less for the public interest than for his own. The remedy, then, for the difficulties which the farmer suffers, as well as the evils which threaten the safety and interests of the country, appears to be simple and easy of application. All that remains is, for the farmer to apply it; and supposing that he does so, let us just take a cursory view of what will probably be the consequence. Assured and confident that he shall obtain a price allowing a reasonable profit for his produce, the farmer will not hesitate to extend his culture. To effect this, an increased agricultural population will be necessary; to supply them with implements and clothes, &c. an additional number of blacksmiths, carpenters, wheelwrights, tanners, harness-makers, shoe-makers, tailors, hatters, shopkeepers, grocers, &c. &c. will be wanted also. Then will follow the parsons, to take care of the souls of the new population; the physicians and surgeons of their bodies, and the lawyers and attornies of their property, &c. The man of letters, too, and the printer will be wanted, to supply them with literary instruction and entertainment, and the player with spectacle and amusement. Room also will be found for a new sett of idlers, as well as unproductive labourers of every description, and for *manufacturers to clothe them all*. In short, so long as you can and do extend your culture, and keep increasing the mean of subsistence, so long will you make fresh elbow-room for every class of society;

but as soon as you cease to do this, so soon will society begin to feel crowded and uncomfortable. Where the paper-money system has been fairly established, capital can never be wanting, neither generally nor individually, to carry on improvement. If an individual have laid out all his capital in reducing waste land to culture, or in a manufacturing establishment, he would be entitled to and obtain credit with his banker, and with his fellow-tradesmen, for the full amount of his disbursement in this way. In short, let but the farmer demand, and he will obtain a fair price for his grain, and then there will, I am persuaded, be nothing to prevent the progress of our country in wealth and improvement, so long at least as it is capable of being improved.

F.

OFFICIAL PAPERS.

(FROM THE VIENNA COURT GAZETTE.)

VIENNA, OCT. 12.—His Majesty the Emperor left Paris on the 29th Sept. for Melun, where he arrived on the 30th. He stopped there during the 1st and 2d, and proceeded on the 3d to the Grand Review appointed to take place on the 5th and 6th, near Dijon. Before the Emperor's departure, Prince Metternich brought him the news of the conclusion of the Preliminaries of a Convention with France. The negotiations for a definitive arrangement, and for the establishment of the relations between France and the Allied Courts, were commenced in form, at Paris, on the 20th of September. The Plenipotentiaries for the Emperor of Austria, were, Princes Metternich and Schwarzenburgh — for Great Britain, Lord Castlereagh, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Duke of Wellington — for Prussia, Prince Hardenberg and Baron de Humboldt — for Russia, Prince de Rosumowsky, and Count Campo d'Istra — for France, Talleyrand, the Duke of Alberg and Baron Louis. — The change of the French Ministry, which took place soon after the opening of the conferences, produced no interruption in the discussions. The Duke of Richelieu immediately on being appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs, took a part in the negotiations as Plenipotentiary for France, and after the conferences had continued for eight days, the Plenipoten-

tiaries in their Meeting of the 2d of October, agreed upon the bases of the Treaty. The Treaty itself, and the Conventions connected with it, are now preparing without delay, and the whole of the business will be concluded in the course of the present month. The Courts of Austria, England, and Prussia, were agreed as to the principles that the *chef d'œuvre* and works of art, which during the war of the revolution had been taken from all parts of Europe, should be restored to their proprietors and towns to which they belonged, and which were proud of their possession. In consequence of this principle, all the objects of art taken in Italy, Germany, Spain, and the Netherlands, have been removed from the Museum of Paris, and the places in which they were exhibited.

" VIENNA, OCT. 13.

" **PROCESS VERBAL OF THE CONFERENCE OF OCTOBER 2.**

" After several confidential explanations between the Plenipotentiaries of Austria, Great Britain, Prussia, and Russia, on one side, and the Duke of Richelieu, appointed Plenipotentiary of his Majesty the King of France on the other side, it has been agreed upon to-day that the relations between France and the Allied Powers armed for the re-establishment and maintenance of the general Peace are definitively regulated, upon the following bases—[Here follow the four articles already published.]

" The Plenipotentiaries having definitively adopted these bases, have concerted upon the course to be adopted, in order to arrive in the shortest possible time at a formal arrangement, and have consequently determined—

" 1. That a general treaty shall be drawn up upon the bases above laid down, and adding to them such articles as by common consent shall be judged necessary to complete it. The French Government will nominate on its part the person who is to unite with those whom the four Courts have charged with the drawing up of the Treaty.

" 2. That the Commissioners appointed for the military affairs shall proceed, conjointly with the Commissioners whom the French Government shall appoint for this purpose, to draw up a project of a Convention to regulate every thing relative to the military occupation, and to the support of the army employed in this occupation. The same Commissioners shall also determine the manner and the periods of the evacua-

tion of all such parts of the French territory as are not comprehended within the line of the military occupation.

" 3. That a Special Commission appointed for that purpose by the contracting parties, shall draw up without delay a plan of a Convention to regulate the mode, the periods, and the guarantees of the payment of the 700,000,000 of francs to be stipulated by the general treaty.

" 4. The Commission formed to examine the reclamations of several Powers relatively to the non-execution of certain articles of the Treaty of Paris, shall continue its labours, with the understanding, that it is to communicate them as soon as possible to the Plenipotentiaries in the principal negotiation.

" 5. That as soon as these Commissioners have terminated their labours, the Plenipotentiaries shall unite to examine the results of them, to determine on the definitive arrangements, and to sign the principal Treaty as well as the different particular Conventions. This Procès Verbal having been read, the Plenipotentiaries have approved it, and signed.

" RASUMOUSKY, WISSENBERG,
" CASTLEREAGH, CAPO D'ISTRA,
" RICHELIEU, HUMBOLDT,
" WELLINGTON, HARDENBERG."

BOURGES, Oct. 19. Marshal the Duke of Tarentum has published in this city the following orders to the army:—

GENERAL ORDERS TO THE ARMY.

His Excellency the Marshal Duke of Tarentum, Commander in Chief of the French troops, is informed that in contempt of orders so often repeated, soldiers have been seen wearing the sign of revolt, and others have been heard to utter seditious expressions. The one and the other have been arrested. His Excellency orders that they shall be brought immediately before the Councils of War of Military Divisions, in the places where the crimes have been committed, to be tried and punished with all the severity of the law. Every soldier, of whatever rank, who shall wear a sign proscribed, and who shall not be decorated with the white cockade, shall be arrested as a rebel, an abettor and instigator of revolt, tried and punished as such. Twenty-four hours after the receipt of the present General Order, the Officers and Chiefs of corps shall be responsible for its non-execution, cashiered, and placed in surveillance at their own houses.

Head-quarters at Bourges, Oct. 10, 1815.

The insurrectional movements which have manifested themselves in some regiments of infantry and cavalry, of which the pay and the messes are merely the ostensible pretext, merit the most exemplary chastisement. His Excellency Marshal the Duke of Tarentum, Commander in Chief of the French troops, orders the Chiefs of Corps to point out the abettors and instigators, and to have them arrested and conducted to the chief place of their military division, with the charges and proofs in support of them. His Excellency expresses his marked

dissatisfaction with the officers and subalterns of the regiments in which the rebellion has most openly shewn itself. He charges them with indifference and want of energy in not finding out and punishing the guilty. He holds them responsible for every movement that shall take place in future, and declares that they shall lose with their employments all the advantages promised by the Ordinances of the King.

(Signed)

The Marshal Duke of TARENTUM,
Commander in Chief of the French Troops.

PRICES CURRENT in London; Prices of FUNDS in England and France; Number of BANKRUPTCIES in Great Britain; and COURSE OF EXCHANGE with Foreign Countries, during the last Week.

BREAD.—The Quartern Loaf, weighing 4lb. 5oz. 8drams, varies at from 9½d. to 11d.

WHEAT.—The Winchester Bushel, or 8 gallons (corn and beer measure), taken on an average of all the prices at Mark Lane Market, 6s. 1d.—The Sack of Flour, weighing 280lbs. 5s. 6d.

MEAT.—The average wholesale price per Pound weight, at Smithfield Market, where the skin and offal are not reckoned at any thing in the price.—Beef, 6½d; Mutton, 6¾d; Veal, 8½d; Pork, 6¾d; Lamb, 8½d.

WOOL.—Vigonia, 16s.; Portugal, 3s.; Spanish Lamb, 9s. 3d.; Leonosa, 7s. 3d.; Segovia, 5s. 9d.; Seville, 4s. 6d.;—This wool is washed and picked.—Wool Imported last week:—From Germany, 1,008lbs.—From Spain, 7,168lbs.—From France, 26,208lbs.

BULLION.—Gold in bars, £4 3s. per ounce.—New Dollars, 5s. 3d. each.—Silver in bars, none.—N. B. These are the prices in Bank of England paper.—In gold coin of the English Mint, an ounce of gold in bars is worth 3l. 17s. 10½d.—Standard Silver in bars, in the coin of the English Mint, is worth 5s. 2d. an ounce. In the same coin a Spanish Dollar is worth 4s. 6d.

ENGLISH FUNDS.—The price of the THREE Per Centum Consolidated Annuities, in Bank Paper; 61.

FRENCH FUNDS.—The price of the FIVE Per Cents, in gold and silver money; 58.

BANKRUPTCIES.—Number, during the last week, published in the London Gazette, 26.

COURSE OF EXCHANGE.

LONDON.	Friday 27.	LONDON.	Friday 27.
Amsterdam	36 10 B 2 U	Bilboa	37
Ditto at Sight	36 4	St. Sebastian	35
Amsterdam	11 5 C.F.	Corunna	35
Ditto at Sight	11 2	Gibraltar	33
Rotterdam	11 6 2 U.	Leghorn	48½
Antwerp	11 6	Genoa	46½
Hamburgh	34 2 2½ U.	Venice	25
Altona	34 5 2½ U.	Malta	49
Bremen	34 5	Naples	41½
Paris 1 Day's Date	24	Palermo	120 per oz.
Ditto	24 20 2 U.	Lisbon	60½
Bordeaux	24 20	Oporto	60½
Frankfort on the Main	141 Ex. Mo.	Rio Janeiro	67
Madrid	36½ effective	Dublin	10½ per Cent.
Cadiz	35½ effective	Cork	11½
Barcelona	35		

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